Although brain science has amassed a great deal of valuable knowledge, a deep understanding of how the brain works remains elusive. There is no comprehensive brain theory, nor a robust cognitive neuroscience framework explaining how the brain gives rise to or relates to the mind. Fundamental questions persist: How does the brain create, compute, mediate, or process sensation and perception? What mechanisms underlie recognition, identification, meaning, thought, emotion, executive control, goals, attention, intention, motor control, and learning? As Jeff Hawkins has often noted, neuroscience is “data rich and theory poor.”
A viable brain theory would be immensely valuable. It could powerfully support applied neuroscience efforts across many domains. The mind/brain relationship forms the foundation for neural decoding, signal classification, neuroimaging interpretation, CNS medicine, biomarker development, neurorobotics, brain-computer interfaces (BCI), neuroprosthetics, knowledge representation, natural language processing (NLP), AGI development, and more.
This raises the question of terminology. For any new brain theory to gain traction, it must first be clearly articulated, then evaluated and tested. It seems logical to rely on standard brain science and cognitive neuroscience terms—such as perceptual processing, semantic and working memory, executive function, the reward system, and similar constructs cataloged in resources like Russell Poldrack’s Cognitive Atlas.
However, a genuinely new theory would be built on new ideas. Conveying these would require at least some new terminology. Existing terms are shaped by current assumptions about the mind/brain relationship. New concepts would need language that better reflects the shifted perspective.
A core example is the materialist foundation of much brain science: the brain is physical, so the “real” aspects of mind are neurons, synapses, and neural activity. In this view, the subjective or immaterial mind is reducible to brain processes.
What if this captures only part of the picture? What if brain and mind manifest simultaneously within the same system, allowing one to be mapped onto the other for reverse-engineering? In such a framework, the mind would be examined directly as a subjective, experiential phenomenon rather than merely an epiphenomenon of neural activity. Standard cognitive neuroscience terms, shaped by materialist assumptions, might then prove suboptimal for describing this mind-first approach.
Standard terms have clear strengths. They encapsulate decades of experimental findings, neuroimaging data, and analyses. Concepts like executive control, reward system activation, visual processing, and cognitive workload reflect real insights into how the brain mediates cognition, memory, and behavior.
Yet these categories are limited. The full scope of the conscious and unconscious mind extends far beyond them. Consciousness encompasses all varieties, instances, and qualities of experience. The mind includes our entire body of knowledge, understanding, and meaning, as well as the dynamic stream of moment-to-moment awareness—what we perceive, recognize, think, imagine, attend to, intend, and learn. This rich repertoire is deployed flexibly to achieve goals in ever-changing contexts.
Cognitive neuroscience terminology captures valuable facets of the mind/brain relationship but I argue represents less than 5% of the overall system. The remaining majority is better reflected in everyday language describing our knowledge of the world.
The “reward system” illustrates this well. Rewarding thoughts and feelings arise constantly—every few seconds, often subtly: understanding a sentence, agreeing with an idea, feeling mild relief at nearing the end of a task, or growing excited about a new concept. What feels rewarding shifts with time, circumstances, culture, personal history, and evolving goals. No two rewarding experiences are identical.
Labeling this simply as “the reward system” is overly simplistic. Accurate description of the mind and its neural correlates requires terms that capture reward in its full diversity and specificity.
Overall, any viable brain theory will need supporting terminology that reflects a fundamentally new way of conceptualizing the system. A correct theory would likely represent a significant departure from prevailing views—and its language would mirror that shift.